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ABSTRACT
In the fight against ISIS, the U.S. has conducted airstrikes, deployed
forces, supported rebellions, trained nonstate actors, and used military
funds in Iraq and Syria. This fight has raised questions regarding the validity
of U.S. authority to use force against ISIS. Imperialists, comprising the
U.S. president and a few congressmen, seek to fight ISIS and believe that
the authority to use force against ISIS comes from the independent
presidential executive powers and Authorizations for Use of Military Force
(AUMFs) in 2001 and 2002. Contrary to their legal conviction and
justifications, imperialists are seeking a new AUMF from Congress to be
able to fight ISIS. On the other hand, congressionalists, comprising the
majority of congressmen, do not seek war with ISIS and believe that this
fight is unauthorized, as the president has no independent executive powers
in non-defensive wars and the scope of AUMFs 2001 and 2002 does not
include ISIS. Moreover, congressionalists do not want to pass a new
AUMF because the US has not suffered a large armed attack by ISIS, the
war on terror has been proved counterproductive, and AUMFs 2001 and
2002 and military funds have been misinterpreted and misused in the past.
This Article concludes that the U.S. does not need a new AUMF, because
imperialists lack a convincing legal argument for the advocacy of imperial
presidential powers or the expansive interpretation of previous AUMFs.
Moreover, the fact that a new AUMF has not yet successfully passed, despite
numerous calls, reflects the consensus among the majority of congressmen
that the U.S. does not need a new AUMF or a new never-ending war.
INTRODUCTION
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 2001 authorizes
the United States’ (U.S.) president to use force against the perpetrators
and plotters of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) events.1 It also allows the
use of force against the nations that harbored the people responsible for
these events.2 Similarly, the AUMF 2002 allows the use of force against
Iraq to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions against the
threats posed by Iraq.3 The subsequent fights against these threats and the
persons responsible resulted in over seventeen years of war in the
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted); 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2018).
2. See id.
3. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J.
Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2002) (enacted); 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2018).
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Middle East;4 using more than a trillion U.S. dollars of military funds,5
and causing the devastation of numerous countries along with civilian
casualties;6 counterproductive increases in terrorism;7 the support and
training of rebel groups that also increase terrorism;8 and the destabilization
of regions.9 This has all led people to question the validity, legality, need, and
efficacy of this war in respect to the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) 10 and the delegation of authority of war powers by
Congress to presidents to use force under AUMFs 2001 and 2002. In response,
presidents have claimed that independent war powers are guaranteed under
the Constitution and they have relied on an expansive interpretation of the
AUMF 2001 and 2002.11 Under the umbrella of the phrase “associated
forces” (which is discussed in detail later in Section II.C.2), there have
been attempts to include ISIS within the scope of AUMFs 2001 and 2002, to
link ISIS with the 9/11 events, and to justify this continuation of war,
especially in Iraq and Syria.12 Presidents, while claiming independent war
powers to justify their actions, have sought new authorization to use force
against ISIS. 13 Many congressmen and scholars have denied the
4. US “War on Terror” Still Rages on 17 Years After 9/11, TRT WORLD (Sept.
11, 2018), https://www.trtworld.com/life/us-war-on-terror-still-rages-on-17-years-after9-11-20138 [https://perma.cc/CQX5-74VN].
5. AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,
AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 5 (2014).
6. MELVIN A. GOODMAN, NATIONAL INSECURITY: THE COST OF AMERICAN MILITARISM
15 (2013).
7. GARY DORRIEN, ECONOMY, DIFFERENCE, EMPIRE: SOCIAL ETHICS FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE 227 (2010).
8. David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt & Ben Hubbard, Trump Ends Covert Aid to Syrian
Rebels Trying to Topple Assad, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/19/world/middleeast/cia-arming-syrian-rebels.html [https://perma.cc/5EC2-F9FG].
9. See DORRIEN, supra note 7.
10. ISIS is also commonly referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq the Levant (ISIL) as it
is a more traditional translation of the Arabic name. Ray Sanchez, ISIL, ISIS or the Islamic
State? CNN (Oct. 25, 2017, 1:30PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/ meast/isisisil-islamic-state/index.html [https://perma.cc/TZ4M-2XAG]. However, throughout this Article
any reference to the jihadist group will be through the use of ISIS.
11. REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 7 (2016) [hereinafter
REPORT].
12. See id. at 4–7.
13. Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the Use
of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, J.
Res. § 2 (2015); see also Letter from President Barack Obama to Congress (Feb. 11, 2015)
(on file with the Obama White House Office of the Press Sec’y).
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independent presidential authority to fight this war against ISIS. Now, the
U.S. is divided into two main groups. One group of people, including the
executive branch of government, the President, and a few congressmen and
scholars, arguing that the U.S. needs a new AUMF to be able to fight ISIS.14
This group argues that a president has independent powers to use force
against ISIS,15 while also claiming authority under an expansive interpretation
of AUMFs 2001 and 2002.16 This group also demands a new AUMF, with
few limitations, to fight ISIS, its cobelligerents, associated forces, and
successors to be able to execute a new unending war.17 The second group
of people, including a majority of congressmen and scholars, argue that the
U.S. does not need a new AUMF to fight ISIS because the U.S. is not at
war with ISIS and international law does not allow the use of force against
a mere threat and not an actual armed attack.18 This group also advocates
the revocation of the existing 2001 and 2002 AUMFs because it believes that
these authorizations have been misinterpreted, abused, and misused to
rationalize invalid, unending, and unjustified wars.19
Therefore, to analyze whether the U.S. needs a new AUMF against ISIS or
not, this Article is divided into six relevant sections that discuss both sides
of the argument. Part I examines the dichotomy of war powers between
Congress and the president of the U.S. It will discuss the objectives of the
founding fathers, the president’s constitutional and independent presidential
powers, congressional powers, and the War Powers Resolution, while relating
these with the narratives of renowned scholars within this context. Part II
discusses the scope and interpretation of the AUMF 2001 in detail. Within
this section, the notions and characteristics of a number of limits—
geographical location; association with the 9/11 events; being an enemy
under the AUMF 2001 including terrorist organizations, associated forces,
ISIS; and duration of the war—will be interpreted. Part III fleetingly

14. See Gregory A. Wagner, Warheads on Foreheads: The Applicability of the 9/11
AUMF to the Threat of ISIL, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 235, 262 (2015).
15. See REPORT, supra note 11.
16. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. § 2 (2015); see also S.J. Res. 47, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R.J. Res. 27, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); S. Res. 1587, 114th Cong. §§ 3, 8
(2015); H.R. Res. 4208, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); S.J. Res. 26, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res.
29, 114th Cong. (2016).
17. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015).
18. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 255–57; see also H.R. 1303, 114th Cong. (2015).
19. MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 7–8
(2017).
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defines the meaning and scope of the AUMF 2002. Part IV briefly discusses
the proposals for a new AUMF against ISIS including proposals to repeal or
limit the existing AUMFs while not seeking a new AUMF to fight ISIS.
Part V analyzes why some people and congressmen do not wish to authorize a
new AUMF against ISIS when there have been so many calls to do so.
Part VI concisely discusses the international law of using force in the context
of war fought and to be fought under the AUMF 2001, the AUMF 2002,
and the proposed “new AUMF against ISIS.”
I. DICHOTOMY OF POWERS
Douglas Kriner argues that the war powers of the president and Congress of
the U.S. are wrongly dichotomized into two clear camps.20 One being that
Congress has exclusive authority to initiate wars, and therefore all
presidential conduct outside this scope is unconstitutional and unlawful.21
The second being that the president has the discretionary power to initiate
wars with or without congressional involvements.22 These wholly contradict
each other. Rather, Douglas Kriner, Mariah Zeisberg, and Stephen Griffin
believe that there is an interbranch deliberation between Congress and the
president of the U.S. where Congress creates a democratic accountability that
imposes tangible political costs on presidents, varying case to case, yet
significant enough at times to change the course of war policies.23
However, Congress has failed to compel presidents through legislation.
Therefore, the imperial presidency independent of congressional involvement
and imperial congressional powers independent of presidential involvement
do not exist. Rather, the real balance of war powers lies between these two
opposing poles.24
For instance, a plain reading of the Constitution, the Convention, and
the ratification debates leaves no ambiguity in suggesting that a president

20. Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in
Times of War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1279–80 (2015).
21. See id. at 1275.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 1288–91; M ARIAH Z EISBERG , WAR P OWERS : T HE P OLITICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 41 (2013); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 50 (2013).
24. Kriner, supra note 20, at 1296.
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cannot independently initiate a war without involving Congress.25 However,
Congress delegated sweeping powers to the president through the AUMF in
200126 by writing a blank check27 “to deter and pre-empt any future acts
of terrorism or aggression against the United States.”28 Although, Congress
limited this with the requirement of appropriate and necessary actions
against the plotters and perpetrators of the events of 9/11.29
Conversely, Presidents have claimed that they possess the prerequisite
authority as commander in chief to initiate wars without involving Congress
under Article II of the Constitution.30 Particularly, following the precedent of
John Yoo at the Office of Legal Counsel, President Obama argued that
Congress could not limit the presidential powers under the Constitution
through the AUMF31 and questioned the legitimacy of legislation against
presidential powers. Subsequently, Obama used force against ISIS thirteen
years after AUMF 200132 with no involvement of Congress and without
ISIS’s association to the 9/11 events. Scholars were eager to decry these
events as the return of the “imperial presidency.”33 In the past, President
Polk’s provocation of the Mexican–American War in 1846 had set the
example for this imperialism.34 Congress lamented this event at that time
by stating “it sets the example, which will enable all future Presidents to
bring about a state of things, in which Congress shall be forced, without
deliberation, or reflection, to declare war, however opposed to its convictions

25. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 11, art. II § 2 cl. 1; see also Charles A. Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672,
674–75 (1972).
26. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted).
27. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1276.
28. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, AUTHORIZATION
FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 2 (2007); see also § 1541 note (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
September 11 Terrorists).
29. See § 1541 note (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11
Terrorists); see also Kriner, supra note 20, at 1276.
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Kriner, supra note 20, at 1276.
31. See generally The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 210 (2001).
32. Kriner, supra note 20, at 1276.
33. See generally CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 14 (2007) for a discussion
of “imperial presidency” throughout history when presidents invoked national security to
seize more power from Congress by advancing the philosophy that the president wields
“vast ‘inherent’ and independent powers not spelled in the Constitution” that permit a
president to defy Congress.
34. See JOHN H. SCHROEDER, MR. POLK’S WAR: AMERICAN OPPOSITION AND DISSENT,
1846-1848, at 24 (1973).
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of justice or expediency.”35 Subsequently, the same imperialism was
repeated by President Jefferson in the Tripolitan War,36 then by President
Johnson in the Vietnam War, then again in Korea by President Truman,
and more recently in Syria and Libya by President Obama.37 In fact,
presidents have used force without congressional authorization in at least
125 instances.38
In opposing this imperialism, Griffin sympathizes with the congressionalists
and argues that even presidents in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did
not claim unilateral war powers while asserting executive powers, such as
Polk who attached congressional approval and war declarations in Rio
Grande and Mexico.39 In an example of stark contrast between presidential
imperialism and congressionalists, Roosevelt cajoled Congress for American
entry into World War II, whereas Truman rejected all congressional appeals
to seek a declaration of war against Korea.40 Misrepresenting the situation,
Truman declared, “we are not at war.”41 The court corrected that the Korean
incident could not have been anything other than war.42 Likewise, the Obama
administration tried to deny the existence of war or hostilities in Libya.43
Zeisberg, on the other hand, believes that Congress and the president
both have their own authorities and powers under the Constitution, where
Congress can declare wars and the president can defend the nation against all
attacks and aggressions.44 However, she maintains that the president can
only use these powers for defensive purposes and not for other purposes.45
As a result, actions like Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia violates these defensive
35. See id.
36. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 22–23 (Mariner
Books 2004) (1973).
37. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1278–79.
38. Louis Fisher, A Challenge to Presidential Wars: Smith v. Obama, 44 CONGRESS &
THE PRESIDENCY 259, 262 (2017); Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States
Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474, 484 (1966).
39. See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 7–8; see also ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 78–84;
Kriner, supra note 20, at 1280.
40. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1280; see also GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 8.
41. The President’s News Conference of June 29, 1950, 1950 PUB. PAPERS 502, 503
(June 29, 1950).
42. Weissman v. Metro. Life Ins., 112 F. Supp. 420, 425 (S.D. Cal. 1953); see Fisher,
supra note 38, at 270.
43. Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html
[https://perma.cc/S83D-W5QW]; Fisher, supra note 38, at 271.
44. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 38–41.
45. See id. at 20; Kriner, supra note 20, 1281–82.
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standards. Therefore, Congress and the president must work hand in hand
with each other to generate an effective system of war powers comprised
of interbranch deliberations and review of each other’s work.46
All presidents since President Truman have contended that they enjoyed
independent war powers without the approval or involvement of Congress.47
Interestingly, when President Obama was a law professor and a senator,
he stated that “the president does not have power under the Constitution
to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve
stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”48 This is very similar
to Zeisberg’s narrative, where a president is only allowed to authorize the
use of force as a defensive measure. However, Obama changed his stance
when he took the presidential office.49 Yet, it is pertinent to note here that
of all the presidents to have claimed this unilateral power to authorize a
war, many if not all sought or used congressional authority to use force,50
which appears to be a contradiction to their legal conviction to claim independent
presidential war powers. For example, President Bush sought congressional
approval for the invasion of Iraq51 while claiming independent authority.52
Similarly, Obama also used the AUMF 2001 on numerous instances to
justify his legal stance to use military force while claiming independent and
exclusive war powers.53 In fact, Obama sought a new AUMF from Congress
to fight ISIS;54 even Truman sought congressional approval through legislation.55
A. Objectives of the Founding Fathers
The framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to vest war powers in
Congress, in the hands of many.56 For instance, at the Philadelphia Convention
of 1787, Charles Pinckney, discussing the motion of the power to make
war, suggested that it is better to vest war powers in Congress because it
46. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 41; GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 8.
47. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1284.
48. David A. Fahrenthold, On Debt and Libya, It’s President Obama vs. Senator
Obama, WASH. POST (June 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-debtand-libya-its-president-obama-vs-senatorobama/2011/06/22/AGhK4AjH_story.html [https://
perma.cc/3WBL-NN9R].
49. See id.
50. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1285.
51. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 7.
52. Presidential Statement on Signing the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 2002 PUB. PAPERS 1814 (Oct. 16, 2002).
53. See REPORT, supra note 11, at 2–8.
54. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the Use of
United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
J. Res. (2015).
55. See 91 CONG. REC. 8185 (1945).
56. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 260–62.
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is “more acquainted with the foreign affairs, and most capable of proper
resolutions.”57 Similar to the opinions of Zeisberg,58 James Madison and
Elbridge Gerry limited presidential war powers to “repel sudden attacks.”59
Similarly, Roger Sherman commented that the president “should be able
to repel and not to commence war.”60 Gerry “never expected to hear in a
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.”61 Likewise,
George Mason was against “giving the power of war to the Executive,
because [it was] not [safe] to be trusted with it. . . . He was for clogging rather
than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.”62 The Madison and Gerry
amendment was successfully passed.63 In the Pennsylvania ratification of
the Convention, James Wilson commented that the checks and balances
in the system:
[W]ill not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in
the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress;
for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.64

Furthermore, John Jay, in the Federalist No. 4, feared against executive orders
that:
[M]onarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but
for purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge
for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their
particular families or partisans[]. . . [and] . . . engage in wars not sanctioned by
justice or the voice and interests of his people.65

57. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966).
58. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 20.
59. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57; Fisher, supra
note 38, at 261.
60. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57; Fisher, supra
note 38, at 261.
61. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57; Fisher, supra
note 38, at 261.
62. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 319; Fisher,
supra note 38, at 261.
63. Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
64. 2 JAMES WILSON, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); Fisher,
supra note 38, at 261.
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 101 (John Jay) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961);
Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
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For instance, Bush’s war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq on the false
claims of possession of weapons of mass destruction and Obama’s military
action against Qaddafi in Libya for regime change turned healthy countries
into failed states and breeding grounds for terrorism.66
B. President’s Independent and Executive Constitutional Powers
The Constitution of the United States vests executive powers to the
president as commander in chief of the Army, Navy, and militia “when
called into the actual Service of the United States.”67 However, the Constitution
limits presidential powers in external affairs. The Constitution requires a
president to acquire the consent and advice of the Senate before agreeing
to a treaty or appointing ambassadors, judges of the Supreme Court, and
other officers.68
Presidents argue that they are implicitly entitled to exclusive powers to
initiate wars because they are commanders in chief of the armed forces
under the Constitution.69 Congress on the other hand, argues that presidents
need congressional authorization for the use of military forces because the
Constitution explicitly vests the power to declare war to Congress.70 There
are precedents for both arguments: where presidents have acquired congressional
approval for military force and involved Congress,71 and where presidents
have not involved Congress to seek any kind of consent for military force.72
However, even those presidents who did not involve Congress for the
authorization of military force have sought congressional authorization
for the use of force at other times. For instance, Truman sought congressional
approval for Korea73 and Obama sought congressional approval for the fight
against ISIS74 while claiming independent and exclusive war powers.75
Outside of Congress, presidents have also accepted the authorization to
use force from regional and international organizations, such as the United
Nations (UN). Initially, the UN Participation Act of 1945 explicitly stated
that agreements needed congressional approval through an Act or joint
66. Fisher, supra note 38, at 268.
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
69. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1279.
70. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 78–84; GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 7; Kriner, supra
note 20, at 1275–78.
71. See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 7; Kriner, supra note 20, at 1280.
72. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 262.
73. See 91 CONG. REC. 8185 (1945).
74. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015).
75. See REPORT, supra note 11.
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resolution.76 By 1949, the UN Participation Act allowed presidents to act
unilaterally for cooperative actions of the UN.77 However, such use of
personnel was limited to 1,000 noncombatant guards or observers.78 As a
result, Truman sought authority from the Security Council, and Clinton did
so for the intervention in Haiti and Bosnia, without involving Congress.79
Interestingly, when Clinton could not achieve the approval of the UN for
authority to use force in Kosovo, he then turned to Congress and claimed
to inform Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution (WPR).80
Similarly, Obama sought to use the authority of the Security Council for
intervention in Libya instead of congressional approval.81 However, Louis
Fisher argues that presidents cannot bypass the requirement of congressional
authorizations under the Constitution. Therefore, any approval for the use
of force from a regional or international organization is unconstitutional.82
From 1789 to 1950, the presidents of the United States have acted constitutionally
under the authority of Congress.83 It was only after Truman’s use of force
without congressional approval in 1950 that presidents including Clinton84
and Obama began to act unconstitutionally, claiming exclusive and independent
war powers.85 The Supreme Court also erroneously endorsed exclusive
presidential war powers in the judgments of United States v. Curtiss-Wright
in 1938 and Zivotofsky v. Kerry in 2015.86
In harmony with Zeisberg’s argument that presidents only possess
defensive war powers,87 the Supreme Court established that “[i]f a war be
made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized
76. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-264, § 6, 59 Stat. 619,
621 (1945); see Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1511, 1520 (1988-1989); Fisher, supra note 38, at 269.
77. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 660, Pub. L. No. 81-341, § 5, 63
Stat. 734, 735–36 (1949).
78. See id.
79. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 270.
80. SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 404 (2002);
see Fisher, supra note 38, at 270.
81. See JASON RALPH, AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR: THE STATE OF THE 9/11 EXCEPTION
FROM BUSH TO OBAMA 24 (2013).
82. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 269.
83. See id.
84. See RALPH, supra note 81.
85. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 269
86. United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135
S. Ct. 2076 (2015); see LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEANINGS 262 (2017); Fisher, supra note 38, at 278.
87. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 38–41; Kriner, supra note 20, at 1281–82.
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but bound to resist the force by force,” and further that the president “does
not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting
for any special legislative authority.”88 This means that a president cannot
initiate a war without congressional approval, but he can use defensive
force without such approval.89 Therefore, Jennifer Daskal argues that
presidents only possess unquestioned independent defensive war powers.90
However, scholars argue that presidents must obtain congressional approval
for the use of military force pursuant to the WPR.91 The first three presidents
shared the same view.92 Contrary to the prevalent beliefs of the framers,93
the Supreme Court in the judgment of Zivotofsky v. Kerry advocated
independent and exclusive presidential war powers, while distorting and
misquoting the writings of Alexander Hamilton.94 For instance, the court
conveniently missed Hamilton’s Federalist No. 70, where he warns against
the sole discretion of a president.95
C. Congress’s War Powers
Through Article I, the Constitution of the U.S. vests vast powers in Congress.
Article I includes:
[The] power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money,
raise and support armies, and provide and maintain a navy. . . regulate commerce
with foreign nations, define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, make rules concerning captures on land and water, and make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces . . . execute the laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.96

88. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862); Jennifer C. Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck,
After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 115, 136 (2014); see U.N. Charter art. 51.
89. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2058 (2005); see THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 224 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2004).
90. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 136–37.
91. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549 (1973); see Daskal & Vladeck,
supra note 88, at 137.
92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89; 30 GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799, at 73
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,1931); 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 57 (1797); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 186–87 (1997).
93. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57; ELLIOT,
supra note 64; THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 295 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961); Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
94. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2085–86 (2015); Fisher, supra note 38, at 262.
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961); see Fisher, supra note 38, at 268–69.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10; Fisher, supra note 38, at 260–61.
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Under the Constitution, Congress is empowered to authorize the executive
branch to use force against any extended threat posed by a group of
people.97 For example, it did so against the perpetrators and plotters of the
9/11 attacks through the 2001 AUMF,98 though there is no precedent for
using force against any such groups under the independent authority of a
president. Why does the Constitution empower Congress to repel invasions
along with the overall power to declare war if it intended to empower
the president to have independent war powers? The founding fathers were
well aware that initiating a war, and thus spending billions of tax dollars,
is a matter of public debate that cannot be entrusted to a single person.99
In 1807, in the famous case of United States v. Smith, the federal
appellate court underscored the ability of congressional war powers to
limit the presidential powers and executive orders to initiate hostilities.100
In this case, Colonel William Smith was indicted for using force against
Spain without congressional approval.101 The court rejected the claim that
a president could somehow violate congressional policy (the Neutrality
Act of 1974) by authorizing use of military force, and stated that the
statute is “declaratory of the law of nations; and besides, every species of
private and unauthorized hostilities is inconsistent with the principles of the
social compact, and the very nature, scope and the end of civil government.”102
The court further established that Smith was right in following the orders
of his chief, but a president cannot waive the statutory provisions and
“cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less
can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids.”103
D. The War Powers Resolution (WPR)
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) through
legislation to limit the extensive claimed presidential war powers.104 The
WPR was vetoed by President Nixon because he believed that the legislation
was encroaching upon the constitutional presidential war powers he held
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 138.
98. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2
(2001) (enacted).
99. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 138.
100. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1229.
103. Id. at 1230.
104. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549 (1973).
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as commander in chief.105 He stated that alteration in the powers of a
president under a constitution cannot be achieved by legislation but only
through an amendment in that constitution.106 He believed that presidents
are empowered with unilateral powers to initiate wars as commanders in
chief; therefore, this legislation was clearly unconstitutional and was
undermining the U.S.’s foreign policy.107 All other presidents after Nixon
have also believed that the WPR is unconstitutional.108 By contrast, Congress’s
view has been that all unilateral authorizations of military force by presidents
in the absence of any imminent attack and without congressional approval
are unconstitutional, which is why it passed the WPR to clarify the limitations
of presidential and congressional war powers.109
The WPR limited the scope of presidential powers to three conditions
under which a president can use unilateral force without seeking congressional
authorization. First, to repel, retaliate, and forestall an imminent threat of
armed attack against U.S. territory. Second, to repel, retaliate, and forestall an
imminent threat of armed attack against U.S. forces outside its territory.
Third, to repel, retaliate, and forestall an imminent threat of armed attack
against U.S. citizens and nationals outside U.S. territory.110 The WPR
further explains that the presidential war powers under Article II of the
Constitution only permit a president as a commander in chief to order
troops pursuant to: (i) a declaration of war, (ii) statutory authorization, or
(iii) a national emergency created by an attack against the U.S., its territory,
or its armed forces.111 The most important limitation on the presidential
war powers by the WPR is the time limitation. Unless Congress authorizes
otherwise, the use of armed forces must be terminated automatically after
sixty days, with an additional thirty-day time limit for the withdrawal of
personnel in the event of a threat to their lives in immediate withdrawal.112
This limitation creates the required check and balance on the presidential
war powers, yet allows forces to defend the U.S. against any imminent threat
105. Stephen M. Griffin, The Executive Power, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 343, 354 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015).
106. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate on the United States Air Strikes against Libya, 1986 PUB. PAPERS
478 (Apr. 16, 1986).
107. See Griffin, supra note 105; Wagner, supra note 14, at 243; Richard Nixon, Veto of
the War Powers Resolution, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/veto-the-war-powers-resolution [https://perma.cc/5U77-G92D].
108. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 243.
109. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 271–72.
110. See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549 (1973).
111. Id. § 1541(c).
112. See id. § 1544(b) (requiring the President to “terminate any use of United States
Armed Forces” within sixty calendar days after either a report is submitted or required to
be submitted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1543).
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effectively, without congressional approval.113 The WPR also requires a
president to consult Congress before introducing its forces in any hostilities
against imminent attack and comply by reporting back to Congress, which
triggers the sixty-day timeline.114 Under the WPR, Congress can, at any
time through a concurrent resolution, also demand the withdrawal of U.S.
forces if they are engaged in hostilities without a declaration of a war.115
In 1975, President Ford reported to Congress after “ordering the U.S. armed
forces to retake the Mayaguez.”116 This was the only report to have cited
Section 4 of the WPR, triggering the sixty-day limitation.117 It was also
completed in the sixty-day timeline required by the WPR.118 In 2001, Congress
authorized President Bush to use force against perpetrators and plotters of
the 9/11 events (AUMF 2001),119 and in 2002 it authorized President Bush
to use force in Iraq (AUMF 2002).120 In support of Congress, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly upheld that presidential wartime actions not approved
by Congress are invalid.121
II. AUMF 2001
After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in the U.S., Congress
authorized the president to use military force against the perpetrators and
the plotters of the event in 2001.122 This authorization contains four main
components: (i) authorization of powers, (ii) identification of the enemy,
(iii) purpose of the authority, and (iv) requirement of reporting. The AUMF
2001 allows the president to use “all necessary and appropriate force,” which
gives the president vast powers to employ all resources and methods available

113. See id. § 1541(c).
114. See id. §§ 1542–1543.
115. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).
116. War Powers, LIBR. CONGRES (Mar. 2007), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/warpowers.php [https://perma.cc/9CEV-GS8L].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2051 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has invalidated a number of [presidential wartime] acts precisely because they lacked
congressional authorization.”); Duncan v. Kahanamoka, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946); Ex
Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304 (1944).
122. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted).
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at his discretion.123 Further, it allows this use of force “against those nations,
organizations, or persons, he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons.”124 Needless to say, this phrase
limits the use of force to the people who were associated with the perpetrators
of the events of 9/11 attack, but includes all the associated nations, groups,
and individuals involved in the attack. The AUMF 2001 defines its purpose
as to “prevent any future acts of international terrorism against United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.”125 The AUMF 2001 obligates
the president to report back to Congress every six months126 to keep the
required check and balance on the executive branch. Therefore, the AUMF is
seen as “full congressional authorization for the President to prosecute a
war” against states and nonstate actors alike that were associated with the
9/11 attacks.127
A. Geographical Location
The AUMF 2001 does not limit its authorization of the use of force by
geographical location. Therefore, the enemy can be encountered if found
anywhere in the world, including the U.S.128 The AUMF includes the U.S.
and all foreign territory by stating that the 9/11 attacks “render it both
necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its right to selfdefense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad.”129
The inclusion of other countries is also apparent by the fact that the AUMF
refers here to the WPR, which deals mainly with the involvement of U.S.
forces in foreign territory.130
B. Association with 9/11
Only days after the AUMF 2001, President Bush stated that the American
war against terror had started with Al Qaeda, but it would not end until every
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c) (requiring the President to “report to the Congress
periodically on the status of [the use of armed forces] as well as on the scope and duration
of such . . . but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six
months”).
127. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2083.
128. See id. at 2117 (“The text of the AUMF imposes no geographic limitation on
the use of force. This distinguishes the AUMF from many prior authorizations to use force
that contained geographic restrictions.”).
129. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted).
130. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2118.
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terrorist in the world is defeated.131 Bush described here a very broad,
limitless, and unbounded war, which had nothing to do with the 9/11 events.
Bush’s stance here is a clear reflection of previous White House demands
from Congress to initiate war against all terrorists, which had been rejected
by Congress.132 By contrast, Congress explicitly intended to limit actions
to those individuals, nations, and organizations with a clear connection to
the 9/11 events.133
C. Enemy
In identifying the enemy, the AUMF 2001 extends to nonstate actors,
individuals, and organizations.134 At first, the White House wanted Congress
to authorize the use of force to deter and preempt future attacks on the
U.S.,135 but Congress rejected such requests and only permitted the use
of force against people associated with the 9/11 events.136 Historically, the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution had made this mistake by not clearly identifying
the enemy, so the authorization had a wide breadth of scope.137 Therefore,
in the floor debates concerning the AUMF of 2001, the requirement that
force is only used against those associated with 9/11 was seen as a vital
limitation on the authorization.138 The AUMF 2001 describes the enemy
131. Pierce Rand, Back to the Congressional Drawing Board: Inapplicability of the
AUMF to Al-Shabaab and Other New Faces of Terrorism, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 117, 136 (2015); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2049.
132. See Rand, supra note 131; GRIMMETT, supra note 28, at 2–3.
133. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted).
134. See id.
135. David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and
Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43
HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 72–73 (2002).
136. See John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Congress Clears Use of Force, $40 Billion
in Emergency Aid, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/2001/09/15/congress-clears-use-of-force-40-billion-in-emergency-aid/d12b4d91cb58-4562-8bed-0236ca7d4f0b/?utm_term=.da6f5d562f98 [https://perma.cc/QG6N-KV6R];
David G. Savage, Vietnam Ghost Haunts Senate, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2001), https://www.
latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-sep-16-mn-46434-story.html [https://perma.cc/V6UT87FW].
137. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,104 (2001) (statement of Rep. DeFazio); id. at 17,120
(statement of Rep. Mink); id. at 17,148 (statement of Rep. Jackson); id. at 17,145 (statement
of Rep. Lee).
138. See id. at 17,138 (statement of Rep Cardin); id. at 17,041 (statement of Sen. Feingold);
id. at 17,040 (statement of Sen. Levin); id. at 17,114 (statement of Rep. Norton); id. at
17,043 (statement of Sen. Snowe).
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rather than naming it for the purposes of using force against them, and it
empowers the president to determine who fits this description.139 The
inclusion of nations and persons is straightforward—it includes nations or
persons involved in the 9/11 attacks or harboring the perpetrators of the 9/11
attacks.140 But the inclusion of “organization” is a bit more convoluted for
the purposes of determining such association.141 Therefore, we seek to
understand what organizations are included within the scope of the AUMF
2001 and what kind of association with these organizations could include
a person within the scope of the AUMF 2001.142 The U.S. Department of
Defense defined an enemy in this regard for the purposes of Guantanamo
detainees as, “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.”143 This, particularly the inclusion of coalition
members, exorbitantly widens the scope of AUMF 2001 because it includes
organizations that had nothing to do with the U.S., Al Qaeda, or the 9/11
events.144
1. Terrorist Organizations
The AUMF covers Al Qaeda (a terrorist organization) because the
organization took direct responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.145 This includes
all present and future members of Al Qaeda regardless of their individual
non-association because these members are impliedly associated with the
9/11 attacks.146 Therefore, arguably all organizations that are agents of Al
Qaeda, participate with it in the war against the U.S., provide assistance
against the U.S., or harbor Al Qaeda come under the scope of the AUMF
2001.147
The AUMF 2001 also includes all organizations that aided, abetted, or
harbored Al Qaeda members in relation to the 9/11 attacks.148 For example,
the Taliban also comes under the AUMF 2001 under the term “associated
forces” because it harbored Al Qaeda.149 This is discussed in the next
139. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2082–83.
140. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a)
(2001) (enacted).
141. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2107–08.
142. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2108.
143. Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7,
2004).
144. See Rand, supra note 131, at 148.
145. 143 DOUGLAS LOVELACE, JR., THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 153 (2016).
146. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2109.
147. Id. at 2113.
148. LOVELACE, supra note 145, at 153.
149. Id.
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subsection, along with the criteria for harboring under the AUMF.150
Similarly, future Al Qaeda members, such as those who had nothing to do
with the 9/11 attacks, also come within the scope of the AUMF 2001.
Additionally, future organizations that associate themselves with Al Qaeda
and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks will come within the scope
of the AUMF 2001 because they impliedly associate themselves with the
9/11 attacks and Al Qaeda’s war against the U.S. through their association
with Al Qaeda.151
2. Associated Forces
Contrary to this executive stance, scholars, such as Pierce Rand, argue
that organizations that may have been associated with Al Qaeda but had
nothing to do with the 9/11 events do not come within the scope of AUMF
2001.152 This is because the sole limitation by Congress’s use of force is
through the identification of the enemy as having an “association with the
events of 9/11,” which is avoided by the executive branch to justify its
unbounded war on terror.153 Congress also identified this presidential
avoidance of the 9/11 association limitation by introducing unbounded
war through the “associated forces” reasoning.154 Congress tried to rectify
the presidential stance in proposed section 1034 of the National Defense
Authorization Act.155 However, the section was removed from the Bill
owing to the threat of veto from the president and his stance against the
section.156 Rand argues that the AUMF 2001 specifically used the past tense
in “planned, authorized, committed, or aided, or harbored” to limit the
enemy to the perpetrators.157 He adds that the AUMF 2001’s scope has
150. See infra Section II.E.
151. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2110.
152. See Rand, supra note 131, at 149–51.
153. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,138 (2001) (statement of Rep. Cardin); id. at 17,041
(statement of Sen. Feingold); id. at 17,040 (statement of Sen. Levin); id. at 17,114 (statement
of Rep. Norton); id. at 17,043 (statement of Sen. Snowe); Rand, supra note 131, at 149–51.
154. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,047 (2001) (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at 17,122
(statement of Rep. Spratt).
155. See Rand, supra note 131, at 149–51; National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1034, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) (enacted).
156. Chris Anders, Obama White House Threatens a Veto Over Worldwide War and
Detention Provisions, ACLU BLOG RIGHTS (May 24, 2011, 9:03 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/national-security/obama-white-house-threatens-veto-over-worldwide-war-and-detentionprovisions [https://perma.cc/8Z6J-YJZJ]; see also National Defense Authorization Act § 1034.
157. See Rand, supra note 131, at 134.
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evolved and outgrown its real objectives to justify a war against all sorts
of Islamic terrorism, which has ostensibly been taken to mean “associated
forces.”158 This has happened mainly after the term “associated forces”
was introduced into the scope of the AUMF 2001 through the definition of
“enemy combatant” in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT),159
which is absent from the original text of the resolution.160 Rand concludes
that terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, regardless of its support for Al Qaeda,161
does not come under the scope of the AUMF 2001.162
Nevertheless, the term “associated forces,” and therefore the association
with Al Qaeda, has been legislatively endorsed by Congress in the Military
Commission Act of 2006163 and the National Defense Authorization Act
of 2012.164 The D.C. court also confirmed in the 2009 Hamlily v. Obama
case, that enemy combatants include Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associate
forces.165 According to the U.S. Department of Defense “associate forces”
are defined “as having two characteristics: (1) an organized, armed group
that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with
al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or it coalition partners.”166
Later, Obama also endorsed the inclusion of “associated forces” in the list
of enemy combatants under the AUMF 2001.167
Despite the definitions, it is still unclear what organizations are covered
by the term “associated forces” within the scope of the AUMF 2001 because
the executive branch has refused to publicize the list of groups covered by
associated forces, for fear of inflating recruitment in these groups by doing
so.168 As such, there is a complete lack of transparency in identifying
158. Id. at 134–35.
159. Id. at 138.
160. Lauren Harper, Want to Know Who the US is at War with? Too Bad, Says Pentagon,
NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Sept. 4, 2013), https://unredacted.com/2013/09/04/want-toknow-who-the-us-is-at-war-with-too-bad-says-pentagon/ [https://perma.cc/22YR-MEXE];
see also Rand, supra note 131, at 135.
161. See Rand, supra note 131, at 147.
162. Id. at 149–51.
163. Military Commissions Act of 2006, S. 3930, 109th Cong. § 948(a) (2006) (enacted).
164. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. Res. 1540, 112th
Cong. §1034 (2011) (enacted).
165. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
166. Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Oxford Union, Speech at Oxford
University: The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30,
2012), https://www.lawfareblog.com/jeh-johnson-speech-oxford-union [https://perma.cc/ 8RYYBQNA].
167. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University
(May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-national-defense-university [https://perma.cc/5A3A-Z4LK].
168. Cora Currier, Who are We at War With? That’s Classified, PROPUBLICA (Jul. 26,
2013, 10:13 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/who-are-we-at-war-with-thats-classified
[https://perma.cc/9L9P-QYUE].
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whether terrorist organizations such as Al Nusra Front, Al-Shabaab, and
Islamic Maghreb are covered or not as associated or affiliated forces of Al
Qaeda, and as a result whether they come under the scope of the AUMF
2001.169 Presently, the list of covered organizations is classified.170
D. ISIS
The Obama administration used the AUMF 2001 as a justification to
launch attacks against ISIS.171 But the grounds for the validity of these
actions are shaky, mainly because Congress did not approve these actions
and the administration relied on the AUMF 2001 for its justification.172
President Obama stretched the meaning and scope of AUMF 2001 by
including ISIS.173 President Obama also declared that he wished to repeal
AUMF 2001, which his administration used to justify its actions against
ISIS.174 By doing so, the Obama administration changed the interpretation
of the AUMF in 2001.175
The Obama administration based its targeting of ISIS on the relationship
between ISIS and Al Qaeda.176 Certainly, there was once some relationship

169. See The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force: Hearing Before the Comm. on Armed Services,
113th Cong. 18–19 (2013) (statement of Sen. John McCain); id. at 27–28 (statement of
Sen. Angus King); Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 124.
170. See The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force: Hearing Before the Comm. on Armed Services,
supra note 169, at 12–13, 30 (statement of Michael A. Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict); see also Rand, supra note
131, at 135.
171. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 248; see also Letter from President Barack Obama to
Cong. of the U.S. on Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forced in Connection
with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Feb. 11, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-statesarmed-forces-connection [https://perma.cc/5FSB-YK2Y].
172. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 247.
173. Id. at 252.
174. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President at the
National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (on file with author); see also Press Release,
Office of the Press Sec’y, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Sept. 11, 2014)
(on file with author).
175. William S. Castle, The Argument for a New and Flexible Authorization for the Use
of Military Force, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 523–31 (2015).
176. Zeke J. Miller, White House: Iraq War Vote: Obama Opposed Could Be Used
for ISIS Strikes, TIME (Sept. 13, 2014), http://time.com/3362683/obama-isis-iraq-syriawar-aumf/ [https://perma.cc/VS6K-2Q43]; see also Wagner, supra note 14, at 255.
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between the two, but that relationship ended when Al Qaeda disassociated
itself from ISIS in 2014177 and shunned its actions.178 Since then, both
organizations have been at war with each other. This raises the question:
did the AUMF 2001 authorize the use of force against the same organization
or not? Gregory A. Wagner argues that, owing to these shaky ties between
Al Qaeda and ISIS, the U.S. must not enter into a long conflict by involving
U.S. forces without first debating it with Congress and acquiring new
authorization.179 Despite Obama’s claims to expand and use AUMF 2001’s
mandate against ISIS,180 and the reliance on independent presidential powers
and AUMF 2001 and 2002,181 the administration formally asked Congress
for authorization of the use of force against ISIS in 2015.182
In the 2016 Legal Framework Report on Use of Military Force, President
Obama clarified his legal position on the administration’s use of force
against ISIS, which includes “airstrikes, military advising, training of Iraqi
security forces and Syrian rebel groups, and military activities of United
States special operations forces in Iraq, Syria and Libya.”183 Rather than
relying on independent presidential powers, the report argues that AUMF
2001 authorizes the use of force against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.184
It further argues that AUMF’s provision to “prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States”185 by those who were
involved in the 9/11 events, allows such use of force against ISIS.186 The
report claims the co-belligerence of ISIS with Al Qaeda links ISIS to the
9/11 events, regardless of the claims of dissociation by the two organizations.187
The report also partly relies on the implied congressional approval of these
177. Liz Sly, Al-Qaeda Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in
Syria, Iraq, WASH. POST. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_
east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/
2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html?utm_term=.73b9e9adb8fd [https://perma.cc/
M7ZD-ZW27].
178. See Sly, supra note 177.
179. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 256.
180. Curtis A. Bradley, & Jack L. Goldsmith, Obama’s AUMF Legacy, 110 AM. J.
INT’L L. 628 (2016)); see also Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve
ISIS Strikes, but Says It Isn’t Necessary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/white-house-invites-congress-to-approve-isisstrikes-but-says-it-isnt-necessary.html [https://perma.cc/E2UV-8NA].
181. See WEED, supra note 19, at 1.
182. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015).
183. See REPORT, supra note 11.
184. Id.
185. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001)
(enacted).
186. See REPORT, supra note 11.
187. Id.
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military actions by showing that Congress did support the same military
actions and campaigns against ISIS in Iraq and Syria through funding.188
E. Duration
The AUMF 2001 does not put any limit on the duration of the conflict
or on its authorization to the president to use force.189 The floor debates in
Congress also do not show any intention to limit the authorization by time;
instead, Congress was aware that this would surely take a long time.190
Senator Joe Biden supported the fact that the AUMF 2001 poses no time
limitations.191 That is why Congress did not include any sunset clause in
the AUMF 2001. Seemingly, the AUMF authorizes the unlimited use of
force unbound by any time limits,192 but it is limited to the perpetrators of
9/11 and their associates.193 Some scholars such as Pierce Rand and Jennifer
Daskal argue that, since Al Qaeda has been crippled after the death of Osama
bin Laden, the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the capture and
death of the masterminds of 9/11, and its military decimation,194 the
AUMF must automatically cease to function.195 Former U.S. Secretary of
Defense, Leon Panetta, also noted the same: that the perpetrators of 9/11
did not pose threat to the U.S. any longer.196 Similarly, Jeh Johnson, the
former General Counsel of the Defense Department, explained in 2012
that, owing to decimation of Al Qaeda, the U.S. “should no longer be
considered [to be in] an armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its Associate

188. See id.; see also WEED, supra note 19, at 3.
189. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2123.
190. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,111 (2001) (statement of Rep. Hastert); id. at 17,112
(statement of Rep. Lantos); id. at 17,120 (statement of Rep. DeLay); id. at 17,047 (statement of
Sen. Biden).
191. Id. at 17,047 (statement of Sen. Biden).
192. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 125.
193. Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2010),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/targeted-killings [https://perma.cc/YTF7-2R9U].
194. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 116.
195. See Rand, supra note 131, at 142.
196. Leon Panetta, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Defense Priorities & Counterterrorism,
Speech Before the Center for a New American Security (Nov. 20, 2012).
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forces.”197 Likewise, Obama agreed that the AUMF 2001’s mandate must
not be expanded any further.198
Other relatively newer organizations such as ISIS present threats to the
U.S. and its citizens.199 Despite this clear exhaustion of the AUMF 2001,
in 2014 Obama expanded the mandate of the AUMF 2001 to use force
against ISIS.200 However, in 2014, Al Qaeda publicly dissociated itself
from ISIS.201 Interestingly, the AUMF does not authorize the use of force
against future terrorist threats against the U.S. that are not associated with
9/11.202 In fact, Congress explicitly rejected requests for authorization to
use force against any future threats.203 Therefore, if there is a new threat
to the U.S. by a newly emergent organization of terrorists, the executive
branch must acquire new authorization from Congress for the use of force
against such a group.204
As a result, there have been numerous proposals and calls for a new
authorization to use force against the threats posed by terrorist organizations
that had nothing to do with the 9/11 events and are not associated with its
perpetrators.205 Even President Obama, an advocate of independent presidential
war powers who had also interpreted the AUMF 2001 most broadly, asked
Congress to approve the use of military force against ISIS.206 Despite
Obama’s claims to expand and use the AUMF 2001’s mandate against

197. Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech at Oxford Union: The
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012); see also
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 180, at 19.
198. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President
at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (on file with author); see also Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 180, at 19.
199. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 117.
200. See Savage, supra note 180; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 180, at
19.
201. See Sly, supra note 177.
202. See GRIMMETT, supra note 28, at 2; see also Rand, supra note 131, at 135.
203. David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and
Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43
HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 73 (2002).
204. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 126.
205. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015); see also S.J. Res. 47, 113th Cong. (2014); see also H.R.J. Res. 27,
114th Cong. (2015); see also H.R.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see also S. Res.
1587, 114th Cong. §§ 3, 8 (2015); see also H.R. Res. 4208, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); see
also S.J. Res. 26, 114th Cong. (2015); see also S.J. Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2016).
206. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015).
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ISIS,207 the administration formally asked Congress for authorization to
use force against ISIS in 2015.208
III. THE AUMF 2002
The AUMF 2002 empowers the president to be able to use force against
Iraq in order to enforce relevant Security Council resolutions and “defend
the national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq.”209 This authorization led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and
subsequently the decline and fall of Saddam Hussein, under the false pretext
of the possession and intention to use weapons of mass destruction.210
Formally, the AUMF had no sunset clause in it. But, arguably, after the
restoration of Iraq as a sovereign state, the removal of Saddam, and the
withdrawal of U.S. forces, the AUMF 2002 is no longer enforceable.211
However, the Obama administration expansively relied on the AUMF 2002
for its actions against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.212
IV. NEW AUMF: PROPOSALS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS
President Obama ordered air strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in
2014 and 2015. The president also ordered military deployments against
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.213 These deployments against ISIS were increased
by the US in 2016.214 Obama relied on the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs for the
legal validity of his actions in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.215 As a result, several
congressmen questioned the independent presidential authority or any authority
to be able to fight ISIS without Congress’s approval.216 In the 113th, 114th,
and 115th sessions of Congress, there were discussions on the proposals

207. See REPORT, supra note 11; Savage, supra note 180; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 180, at 19.
208. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015).
209. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2002) (enacted).
210. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 268.
211. See WEED, supra note 19, at 2–3.
212. See REPORT, supra note 11; WEED, supra note 19, at 2–3.
213. WEED, supra note 19, at 1.
214. Id.
215. See REPORT, supra note 11; see also WEED, supra note 19, at 4.
216. See WEED, supra note 19, at 3–4.
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to require or acquire a new AUMF against ISIS by the president and
Congress.217 In 2015, President Obama sent his own proposal for a new
AUMF against ISIS to Congress.218 Furthermore, there have been several
proposals for a new AUMF in Congress and proposals to repeal the existing
AUMFs without introducing a new one.219 However, despite numerous
calls for a new AUMF against ISIS by Congress and the president, to this
date (September 2018), no new AUMF proposal against ISIS has been
successfully passed by Congress, and every proposal had been rejected
for one reason or another.220
A. Proposals for a New AUMF
The first proposal was presented by Senate Foreign Relations Committee
chairman Robert Menendez in 2014. This sought authorization to use
force against ISIS, with a sunset clause of three years and the repeal of
AUMF 2001.221 Secretary of State John Kerry remarked that such authorization
was not flexible enough to allow the U.S. president to efficiently fight
ISIS, owing to its sunset clause.222 The second proposal was presented by
Congressman Adam Schiff in 2015. This proposal allowed the use of force
against ISIS but limited the use to Syria and Iraq with no ground forces,
except for special operations forces.223 The proposal also had a sunset
clause of three years and would have repealed AUMFs 2001 and 2002 on
its enactment.224 The third proposal was presented by Congressman Adam
Kinzinger in 2015. This proposal allowed the use of force against ISIS and its
associated forces, including its successors and closely related organizations.225
It demanded presidential reports every three months and the revocation of

217. See generally WEED, supra note 19.
218. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at summary.
219. See generally WEED, supra note 19.
220. See generally WEED, supra note 19.
221. S.J. Res. 47, 113th Cong. (as proposed by S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Dec.
13, 2014).
222. S.J. Res. 47, 113th Cong. pt. VIII (Sec’y of State John Kerry rejecting the
proposal to impose time limits on an authorization for the use of force on the President
because it would “preemptively bind the hands” of the President).
223. Draft Proposal from Rep. Adam Schiff to Congress: Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, H.J. Res. 27, 114th Cong.
(2015).
224. Draft Proposal from Rep. Adam Schiff to Congress: Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, H.J. Res. 27, 114th Cong.
§ 2 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 5.
225. Proposal from Rep. Adam Kinzinger to Congress: Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, H.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. (2015).
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the 2002 AUMF.226 The fourth and fifth (identical) proposals were presented
by Senators Tim Kaine and Jeff Flake and Congressmen Scott Rigell and
Peter Welch in 2015.227 These proposals allowed the necessary and appropriate
use of force against ISIS and its associated forces.228 They opposed the
involvement of ground troops, introduced a sunset clause of three years,
and also demanded the revocation of the 2002 AUMF.229 The sixth proposal
was presented by Senator Lindsey Graham in 2015. This proposal authorized
the president to use all necessary force against ISIS and its associated
forces and successors, free from any limitations or qualifying conditions.230
The seventh proposal was presented by Congressman Schiff in 2015. This
proposal allowed the use of appropriate force against ISIS, Al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and their associated forces and cobelligerents.231 After enactment,
this proposal would have repealed both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.232 It had
a sunset clause of three years, and it demanded reports from the president for
Congress.233 This included a list of targeted organizations in a federal
register, along with the reasons for including them, and a list of U.S. forces
deployments.234 The eighth proposal was presented by Senator Mitch
226. H.J. Res. 33 § 3, 114th Cong. (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 5–6.
227. Proposal from Sen. Tim Kaine & Sen. Jeff Flake: Authority for the Use of Military
Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, S. 1587, 114th Cong. (2015);
Proposal from Rep. Scott Rigell & Rep. Peter Welch: Authority for the Use of Military
Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, H.R. 4208, 114th Cong. (2015);
WEED, supra note 19, at 6.
228. S. 1587, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); H.R. 4208, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); WEED, supra
note 19, at 6.
229. S. 1587, 114th Cong. §§ 3, 4, 7 (2015); H.R. 4208, 114th Cong. §§ 3, 4, 7 (2015);
WEED, supra note 19, at 6.
230. Proposal from Sen. Lindsey Graham: Authorization for the Use of Force Against
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its Associated Forces, S.J. Res. 26, 114th
Cong. § 2 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 6.
231. Draft Proposal from Rep. Adam Schiff: Consolidated Authorization for the Use
of Military Force Resolution of 2015, H.J. Res., 114th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2015), https://www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SCHIFF_023_xml.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2HTW-T8H7]; see also WEED, supra note 19, at 6–7.
232.
Draft Proposal from Rep. Adam Schiff: Consolidated Authorization for the Use
of Military Force Resolution of 2015, H.J. Res., 114th Cong. § 4(1), (2); see also WEED,
supra note 19, at 6–7.
233.
Draft Proposal from Rep. Adam Schiff: Consolidated Authorization for the Use
of Military Force Resolution of 2015, H.J. Res., 114th Cong. §§ 2(b), 3; see also WEED, supra
note 19, at 6–7.
234.
Draft Proposal from Rep. Adam Schiff: Consolidated Authorization for the Use
of Military Force Resolution of 2015, H.J. Res., 114th Cong. § 3(a)(1), (c)(1); see also
WEED, supra note 19, at 6–7.
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McConnell in 2016. This proposal authorized the use of appropriate force
against ISIS and its associated forces and successors.235 Similarly, the
ninth proposal was presented by Congressman Scott Perry in 2016. This
proposal authorized the use of force against several known terrorist
organizations, including ISIS.236 The tenth proposal was presented by
Congressman Adam Kinzinger in 2017 and was known as H.J. Res. 63. This
proposal authorized the use of appropriate force against ISIS, its associated
forces, and its successors.237 It required the president to report to Congress
every three months and repeal the AUMF 2002.238 The eleventh proposal
was presented by President Obama in 2015. This proposal authorized the
use of appropriate force against ISIS, its associated forces, and its
successors.239 This authorization did not include the use of ground forces
and had a sunset clause of three years, which demanded revocation of
AUMF 2002.240 It also required the president to report to Congress every
six months.241
B. Proposals to Repeal or Limit the Existing AUMFs
In addition to proposals for a new AUMF against ISIS, there have been
several senators and congressmen who have opposed the proposals for a
new AUMF against ISIS, instead proposing and advocating revocation of
or limitations to the existing AUMF. The first proposal was presented by
Congresswoman Barbara Lee in 2015. This proposal called for the repeal
of both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs without introducing a new AUMF targeting
ISIS.242 Instead it placed additional requirements on the president to report
235. Proposal from Sen. Mitch McConnell: Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its Associated Forces, S.J. Res. 29,
114th Cong. § 2(a) (2016); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 7.
236. Draft Proposal from Rep. Scott Perry: Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Islamist Extremism, H.J. Res., 114th Cong. § 2 (2016); see also WEED, supra note
19, at 7.
237. Proposal from Rep. Adam Kinzinger: Authorization for Use of Military Force
against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, H.R.J. Res. 63, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017);
see also WEED, supra note 19, at 8–9.
238. H.R.J. Res. 63, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 8–9.
239. Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the Use
of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
J. Res. § 2 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 9–10.
240. Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the Use
of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
J. Res. § 3 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 9–10.
241. Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the Use
of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
J. Res. § 4 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 9–10.
242. Proposal from Rep. Barbara Lee: Comprehensive Solution to ISIL Resolution,
H. J. Res. 30, 114th Cong. § 6 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 7.
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to Congress every 90 days about strategies to dismantle ISIS through
nonmilitary activities.243 The second proposal was presented by Senator
Ben Cardin in 2015 and demanded revocation of the AUMF 2001.244 The
third proposal was presented by Congresswoman Barbara Lee in 2015 in
the shape of two separate Bills. This proposal proposed to repeal the AUMF
2001 and the AUMF 2002 on the grounds that they were being used to
justify a never-ending war, which was inconsistent with the congressional
powers to declare war.245 Congresswoman Lee also sought prohibition on
the use, abuse, and exploitations of funds regarding AUMF 2001 and AUMF
2002, which would have stopped the use of funds in the fight against ISIS.246
The third proposal was presented by Congressman James McGovern in
2017. Like Lee’s proposals, McGovern also sought the prohibition on the
use of funds used in the fight against ISIS.247
Furthermore, pursuant to the WPR, Congress, in the concurrent resolution
presented by Congressmen Jim McGovern, Walter Jones, and Barbara Lee
in 2015, demanded that president remove the forces deployed in Iraq and

243. H.J. Res. 30, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); see also WEED, supra note 19, at 7.
244. Proposal from Sen, Benjamin Cardin: Sunset of the 2001 Authorization for Use
of Military Force, S. 526, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
245. Proposal from Rep. Barbara Lee: Repeal of the Authorization for Use of Military
Force, H.R. 1303, 114th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2015); Proposal from Rep. Barbara Lee, H.R. 1304,
114th Cong. (2015).
246. See Proposal from Rep. Barbara Lee: Amendment to the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, H.Amdt. 482 to H.R. 2685, 114th Cong. (2015); see Proposal from Rep.
Barbara Lee: Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.Amdt. 484
to H.R. 2685; see Proposal from Rep. Barbara Lee: Amendment to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, H.Amdt. 1216 to H.R. 5293, 114th Cong. (2016); see also
161 C ONG . R EC . H4116-18 (daily ed., June 10, 2015) (statement of Rep. Lee) for a
discussion regarding an amendment to Department of Defense Appropriations Act to
prohibit the use of funds to be obligated or expended pursuant to the AUMF; see also 162
CONG. REC. H3929-30 (daily ed. June 16, 2016) (statement of Rep. Lee) for a discussion
regarding an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act requiring the
presence of a new ISIL-specific AUMF and to prohibit the use of funds for the 2001
AUMF; see also WEED, supra note 19, at 7–8.
247. See Proposal from Rep. James McGovern: Amendment to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, H.Amdt. 1215 to H.R. 5293, 114th Cong. (2016); see also
162 CONG. REC. H3928 (daily ed. June 16, 2016) (statement of Rep. McGovern) for a
discussion regarding an amendment to Department of Defense Appropriations Act to
prohibit funds being obligated for combat operations in Iraq or Syria unless an AUMF is
enacted; see also WEED, supra note 19, at 7–8.
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Syria against ISIS, as required by Section 5(c) of the WPR.248 But, the
resolution failed to pass by 139–288 votes.249
C. Scope of the New AUMF
The new AUMF proposals against ISIS generally include sunset clauses
of three years, the identification of enemy as ISIS, its cobelligerents, its
successors, and its associated forces, the revocation of AUMF 2001 and
AUMF 2002, and a reporting requirement on the president toward Congress.250
If approved, the new AUMF would widen the scope of the U.S.’s global
use of force against terrorism, because the terms “cobelligerents” and
“associated forces” have been controversially abused in the past. So, it is
very likely it will continue in the future. But, the sunset clauses in the new
AUMF and repealing the provisions for previous AUMFs251 will ensure
that the new AUMF is not extensively abused and used as a justification
for unending wars. However, senators have criticized a new AUMF to
fight ISIS by arguing that since there has been no sustained armed attack
that can justify the U.S.’s actions against ISIS or its deployment of forces
in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. is not at war with ISIS and therefore does not
need a new AUMF.252
V. NO NEED FOR A NEW AUMF
Jennifer Daskal argues that calls for a new AUMF are unnecessary,
unwise, and provocative, since we should be seeking out peace rather than
open-ended253 war, for five reasons.254 First, the U.S. presidential authority to
counter a threat in self-defense is fully capable of thwarting any threats
posed by ISIS.255 Second, cooperation among states to fight terrorism has
proven to be a more efficient way to counter threats posed by terrorist
248. Proposal from Rep. James McGovern: Removal of U.S. Armed Forces deployed
to Iraq or Syria, other than Armed Forces Required to Protect United States diplomatic
Facilities and Personnel, from Iraq and Syria, H.R. Con. Res. 55, 114th Cong. (2015); see
also WEED, supra note 19, at 8.
249. See WEED, supra note 19, at 8.
250. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. § 2 (2015); see also S.J. Res. 47, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R.J. Res. 27, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); S. Res. 1587, 114th Cong. §§ 3, 8
(2015); H.R. Res. 4208, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); S.J. Res. 26, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res.
29, 114th Cong. (2016).
251. Id.
252. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 127.
253. Id. at 119, 127.
254. Id. at 119, 127.
255. Id. at 127.
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organizations.256 Third, the threat posed by new organizations such as ISIS
does not equate to an armed conflict since there has been no armed attack
like 9/11 by ISIS or similar organizations.257 Fourth, if an armed conflict
is declared or sustained because of an armed attack or a declaration, then
Congress can easily pass a resolution to fight such an identified group when
required, as it did after the 9/11 events.258 Fifth, the expansive way of fighting
unending wars is inefficiently counterproductive259 and increases, rather than
eradicates, the threats posed by terrorists.260 Instead, this way of war
destabilizes regions and increases terrorism by defining terrorists broadly261
and by making illegitimate drone strikes.262 Terrorist organizations do pose a
threat to the U.S. But it is not the kind of threat posed by Al Qaeda and
linked to the 9/11 events. Obama noted that the U.S. cannot end its war on
terrorism.263 Thus, it is only unwise to authorize open-ended war powers
for threats posed by these organizations without public debate.264

256. Id. at 127.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 127–28.
259. See Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism implications of
Targeted Killings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rosa Brooks,
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); Dennis Blair, Opinion, Drones
Alone Are Not the Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/
15/opinion/drones-alone-are-not-the-answer.html [https://perma.cc/N3VB-24F4]; U.S.
DEP’T OF ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY paras. 1-128, 1-129 (Field Manual no. 3-24, 2006);
Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 139–40.
260. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 127–28.
261. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism,
Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law & Security: Strengthening our Security
by Adhering to our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/pages/docs/speaking-the-law-appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDL9-AUZ6].
262. Hoglar Stark, Drone Killing Debate: Germany limits Information Exchange with
US Intelligence, DER SPIEGEL (May 17, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
drone-killing-debate-germany-limits-information-exchange-with-us-intelligence-a-762873.html
[https://perma.cc/HP8Q-HZVP]; see Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 140–41.
263. Id. at 128–29.
264. Id.
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VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international law of using force allows the use of force in self-defense265
only against a sustained266 and large-armed attack,267 and does not allow
the preemptive use of force against mere threats.268 In the fight against
ISIS, the U.S. has not sustained a large armed attack by ISIS; rather, it
poses a future threat to the US.269 The international law of using force also
denies the right to self-defense against non-state actors residing in neutral
states.270 Moreover, the principles of proportionality, distinction,271 and
necessity272 oblige that the reactionary use of force must be necessary and
proportional.273 However, the aggression in the shape of the seventeen years
of war against terrorism, coupled with the proposals for possibly a new
unending war authorization, is neither necessary nor proportional: all other
peaceful ways of ending the conflicts have not been exhausted. Similarly,
the (1) seventeen years of war, (2) use of more than a trillion dollars of military
funds,274 (3) devastation of several countries without distinguishing between
civilian targets,275 (4) training of rebels,276 and (5) subsequent destabilization
of regions counterproductively increased, rather than eradicated, terrorism,277
and it is not at all proportional with the catastrophe of the 9/11 events or
the threat posed to the U.S. by these organizations.

265. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
266. ANDERS HENRIKSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 273 (OUP, 2017).
267. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶¶ 144–47 (Dec. 19).
268. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 128–29.
269. See REPORT, supra note 11.
270. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar). v. U.S.,
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 55 (June 27).
271. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]; see also GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 285 (CUP, 2010).
272. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 270, art. 8.
273. See id.; see also Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I) art. 48, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]; see also GARY
D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR
285 (CUP, 2010).
274. AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33110, COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,
AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 8 (2011).
275. MELVIN A. GOODMAN, NATIONAL INSECURITY: THE COST OF AMERICAN MILITARISM
5 (2013).
276. David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt & Ben Hubbard, Trump Ends Covert Aid to Syrian
Rebels Trying to Topple Assad, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
07/19/world/middleeast/cia-arming-syrian-rebels.html [https://perma.cc/SGM7-V7JD].
277. See DORRIEN, supra note 7, at 227.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. President and Congress are wrongly dichotomized into two
clear camps: (1) exclusive congressional authority to initiate wars and (2)
independent presidential executive powers to initiate wars with or without
congressional involvement.278 Both wholly contradict each other. Instead,
Douglas Kriner, Mariah Zeisberg,279 and Stephen Griffin280 believe that there
is an inter-branch deliberation between Congress and the president.281 The
actual balance of war powers lies between these two opposing poles.282
For instance, a plain reading of the Constitution, the Convention, and the
ratification debates leaves no ambiguity in suggesting that a president cannot
independently initiate a war without involving Congress.283 However,
Congress has delegated sweeping powers to the president through AUMFs
2001 and 2002, by writing a blank check,284 though limiting the use of
appropriate force against the plotters and perpetrators of the events of 9/
11.285 However, presidents have extensively claimed that they possess the
prerequisite authority to initiate wars without involving Congress under
Article II of the Constitution.286 They rely on 125 instances where presidents
have used force without involving Congress.287 Presidents in the eighteenth
and nineteenth century including Polk, however, did not in these instances
claim unilateral war powers while asserting executive powers, and even sought
congressional approval and war declarations in Rio Grande and Mexico.288
An example of the stark contrast between presidential imperialism and
congressionalists can be seen when comparing how Roosevelt cajoled
278. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1275.
279. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 78–84.
280. See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 7–8.
281. See Kriner, supra note 20, at 1275–76.
282. Id. at 1275–78.
283. See Lofgren, supra note 25.
284. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted); see Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2002) (enacted); Kriner, supra note 20, at 1276;
see also GRIMMETT, supra note 28, at 2–3.
285. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted); see Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2002) (enacted); see also Kriner, supra note 20, at 2.
286. U.S. CONST. art. II; see also Kriner, supra note 20, at 1276.
287. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 262; Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States
Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 473, 484 (Mar. 28, 1966).
288. See GRIMMETT, supra note 28; Kriner, supra note 20, at 1980; GRIFFIN, supra
note 23, at 7–8.
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Congress for American entry in World War II, whereas Truman rejected
all congressional appeals to seek a declaration of war against Korea.289 In
fact, rightfully, Congress can declare wars, and the president can defend
the nation against all attacks and aggression. However, the president can
only use these powers for defensive purposes, and not for other purposes.290
Yet, it is pertinent to note here that, of all the presidents that did claim the
unilateral power to authorize a war, many if not all of them sought or used
congressional authority to use force,291 which appears to be a contradiction to
their legal argument to claim independent presidential war powers. The
framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to vest war powers in Congress,
in the hands of many,292 because the executive branch was not to be trusted.293
They intended to limit presidential powers to only repelling attacks,294 and
not to commence them,295 and to install appropriate checks and balances
in this system.296 The Supreme Court validated this assertion that presidents
are bound to repel attacks and not initiate them.297 Consequently, presidents
only possess unquestioned independent defensive war powers.298 However,
for the extended use of force against non-imminent threats, scholars argue
that under the WPR, the president must obtain congressional approval for
the use of military force.299 Why does the Constitution empower Congress
to repel the invasions along with the overall power to declare war if it
intended to empower the president to have independent war powers? The
founding fathers were well aware that initiating a war, or spending billions
of tax dollars, is a matter of public debate.300 In the famous case of United
States v. Smith, the court also agreed that a president cannot waive the statutory

289. See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 7–8; Kriner, supra note 20, at 6.
290. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 38–41; Kriner, supra note 20, at 1281–82.
291. See ZEISBERG, supra note 23, at 7; George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, U. CAL. SANTA
BARBARA: AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2002), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/statement-signing-the-authorization-for-use-military-force-against-iraq-resolution2002 [perma.cc/LER3-DWN2].
292. See ELLIOT, supra note 64, at 2:528; see also Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
293. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at
2:318; see also Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
294. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 2:318;
see also Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
295.
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 2:318;
see also Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
296. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 261; see also ELLIOT, supra note 64, at 2:528.
297. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 136; U.N. Charter art. 51; The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
298. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 146.
299. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (1973); see also Daskal &
Vladeck, supra note 88, at 137.
300. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 138.
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provisions and “cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution,
and still less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids.”301
However, AUMF 2001 allows the president to use “all necessary and
appropriate force” and gives the president vast powers to employ all resources
and methods available to his discretion.302 The AUMF 2001 allows this
use of force “against those nations, organizations, or persons, [that the
president] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons,”303 to “prevent any future accts of international terrorism against
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”304 The AUMF
2001 does not limit its authorization of use of force by geographical
location.305 The only limitation is the requirement of the connection of the
enemy with the 9/11 events.306 Al Qaeda (which was responsible for the
9/11 events)307 and the Taliban (which harbored Al Qaeda)308 come within
the scope of the AUMF 2001.309 However, the executive branch widened
this 9/11 connection limitation by including all “hostilities against coalition
members” in the definition of its enemy.310 This disproportionately widened
the scope of the 2001 AUMF, because it included organizations that had
nothing to do with the U.S., Al Qaeda, or the 9/11 events311 to justify its
unbounded war on terror.312 The scope of AUMF 2001 has evolved and
outgrown its real objectives in order to justify war against all sorts of Islamic
terrorism, which has ostensibly been taken to mean “associated forces.”313
301. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
302. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001)
(enacted).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. Id.
307. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 2109.
308. See LOVELACE, supra note 145, at 153.
309. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009); K. ALAN KRONSTADT
& KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34763, ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN THE
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER REGION AND U.S. POLICY 6 (2008); President Barack
Obama, Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dec. 1,
2009); Rand, supra note 131, at 142.
310. See Rand, supra note 131, at 148.
311. See id.
312. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,138 (2001) (statement of Rep. Cardin); id. at 17,041 (statement
of Sen. Feingold); id. at 17,040 (statement of Sen. Levin); id. at 17,114 (statement of Rep.
Norton); id. at 17,043–44 (statement of Sen. Snowe); Rand, supra note 131, at 149–51.
313. See Rand, supra note 131, at 134–35.

35

QURESHI (AUMF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/23/2020 11:10 AM

For instance, President Obama stretched the meaning and scope of AUMF
2001 by including ISIS,314 as a justification to launch attacks315 without
congressional approval.316 The U.S. is targeting ISIS on the presumption
of its association with Al Qaeda. The U.S. is relying on the expansive
interpretation of the term “associated forces”317 to extend Al Qaeda’s
responsibility for the 9/11 events to ISIS despite the fact that Al Qaeda
has disassociated itself from ISIS.318 As a result, scholars argue that because
of the shaky ties between Al Qaeda and ISIS, the U.S. must not enter into
a long-term conflict with ISIS by involving U.S. forces without first debating
it with Congress and acquiring new authorization.319 Despite Obama’s
claims to expand and use AUMF 2001’s mandate against ISIS,320 and the
reliance on independent presidential powers and AUMFs 2001 and 2002,321
the administration formally asked Congress for a new AUMF against ISIS
in 2015.322
In conclusion, the U.S. is divided into two groups; imperialists and
congressionalists. Imperialists, comprising of the president and a few
congressmen, advocate for the fight against ISIS, whereas congressionalists,
comprising of the majority of congressmen and a few scholars, do not seek
war against ISIS. Imperialists exorbitantly claim that the fight against ISIS
is authorized by imperialistic independent presidential executive powers
and by both AUMFs 2001 and 2002.323 For this, imperialists rely on
misinterpretations of the Constitution and AUMFs 2001 and 2002.324
Interestingly, imperialists also seek a new AUMF from Congress to be able
to fight ISIS.325 By seeking a new AUMF, imperialists confirm that they
314. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 252.
315. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015); see also Letter from President Barack Obama to Congress (Feb.
11, 2015) (on file with the Obama White House Office of the Press Sec’y).
316. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 247.
317. See Miller, supra note 176; see also Wagner, supra note 14, at 255.
318. See Sly, supra note 177.
319. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 256.
320. See Savage, supra note 180; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 180, at
20.
321. See WEED, supra note 19, at 1.
322. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, J. Res. (2015).
323. See REPORT, supra note 11.
324. See WEED, supra note 19, at 7.
325. See Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress: Authorization for the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant, J. Res. (2015); see also Presidential Draft Proposal Submitted to Congress:
Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, J. Res. § 2 (2015); see also S.J. Res. 47, 113th Cong. (2014);
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lack the legal basis to advocate authority to fight ISIS through the mandate
of imperialistic independent presidential powers or the AUMFs 2001 and
2002. On the other hand, congressionalists believe that the independent
presidential war powers are limited to the defensive use of force.326 Therefore,
the executive branch needs congressional approval for any long-term use
of force against future threats.327
Congressionalists also believe that the scope of AUMFs 2001 and 2002
does not include ISIS,328 and the U.S. does not need a new AUMF or a new
never-ending war.329 This argument is rooted in the fact that the U.S. has
not sustained a large armed attack by ISIS,330 the war on terror has been
proved counterproductive,331 and the previous AUMFs have been misused
and misinterpreted.332 Moreover, because Congress has not yet passed a new
AUMF, it is evident that the consensus amongst the majority of congressmen
is that the U.S. does not need a new AUMF to fight ISIS or authorize a
new never-ending war. Therefore, this Article concludes that the U.S. does
not need a new AUMF, since it is not at war with ISIS.333 The presidential
war powers have been misused in the past, and the scope of both AUMFs
2001 and 2001 has been expansively interpreted and subsequently misused
to continue a never-ending war.334

H.R.J. Res. 27, 114th Cong. (2015); see also H.R.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see also
S. Res. 1587, 114th Cong. §§ 3, 8 (2015); see also H.R. Res. 4208, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015);
see also S.J. Res. 26, 114th Cong. (2015); see also S.J. Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2016).
326. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 119–36; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 2:318; Fisher, supra note 38, at 261.
327. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 256.
328. See Wagner, supra note 14, at 252.
329. See Weed, supra note 19, at 7.
330. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 128; see also Wagner, supra note 14,
at 256.
331. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 128; see also DORRIEN, supra note 7,
at 227.
332. See WEED, supra note 19, at 7.
333. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 88, at 128.
334. See WEED, supra note 19, at 5–9.
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